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INTRODUCTION
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (the
CorruptionAct) provides in s 29 for the creation by the National Treasury of
a Register for Tender Defaulters. A court convicting a contractor on charges
under ss 12 or 13 of the Corruption Act (which relate to corruption offences
in public procurement) may order the contractor to be endorsed on this
register. Endorsed contractors will be denied access to public contracts
(debarred) for a period of between ﬁve and ten years (s 28(3)(a)(ii) and (iii)).
In the almost four years since the creation of the register, no contractor has
been endorsed and consequently debarred from government contracts under
the Act. Part of the reason for this lack of endorsements is certainly that the
Corruption Act does not operate retrospectively (see s 36), so that
convictions under the Act and consequent endorsements on the register can
be obtained only for misconduct following its enactment on 27 April 2004.
While many of the current prosecutions involving corruption charges are
being carried on under theAct’s predecessor, the CorruptionAct 94 of 1992,
it is to be expected that the Corruption Act of 2004, and concomitantly the
Register for Tender Defaulters, will become more relevant over time.
However, in our view, a second factor that may contribute to the empty
register and that will continue to have an adverse impact on the use of the
new debarment procedure under the Corruption Act is uncertainty about
the precise rationale behind the debarment procedure and its proper place in
South African public procurement regulation.
In this note we assess the rationale behind the debarment mechanism in
the Corruption Act and thus the reason for the existence of the Register for
Tender Defaulters. Postulating such a rationale is necessary as it enables us to
map out the exact positioning of the Register for Tender Defaulters vis-à-vis
other debarment mechanisms in South African law, and further, it enables us
to identify a number of factors that are important for the courts to consider
when deciding whether to order a particular contractor to be endorsed on
the register.
THE CORRUPTION ACT AND REGISTER FOR TENDER
DEFAULTERS
The Corruption Act forms the legislative centrepiece of the South African
government’s ﬁght against corruption in both the private and public sectors.
The Act creates three speciﬁc offences in relation to public procurement.
Section 12 criminalizes bribery in obtaining a public contract as an ‘offence
of corrupt activities relating to contracts’. This offence is deﬁned in the Act
to include situations where a person accepts or agrees to accept, offers or
agrees to offer, or gives any gratiﬁcation, for his beneﬁt or the beneﬁt of
another person, in order to inﬂuence in any way the promotion, execution
or procurement of a contract with a public entity. Section 13 relates to
situations where a person offers, agrees to offer or to accept, or accepts any
gratiﬁcation as an inducement to or in order to inﬂuence another person to
award a tender, make a tender or withdraw a tender for a contract. This
second offence is termed ‘corrupt activities relating to procuring and
withdrawal of tenders’. Section 17 criminalizes the holding of a personal
interest by a public ofﬁcer in a public contract. Under this section it is an
offence for any public ofﬁcer to acquire or hold ‘a private interest in any
contract, agreement or investment emanating from or connected with the
public body in which he or she is employed or which is made on account of
that public body’, subject to a number of exclusions (s 17(2)).
Apart from the general penalties of imprisonment and ﬁnes (s 26), the Act
creates the additional penalty of endorsement on the Register for Tender
Defaulters for offences contemplated in ss 12 and 13. In addition to the
endorsement of the convicted person on the register, s 28 also authorizes the
convicting court to order the endorsement of a number of related persons
and relevant information pertaining to the conviction (see Sope Williams &
Geo Quinot ‘Public procurement and corruption: The South African
response’ (2007) 124 SALJ 339; Phoebe Bolton ‘The exclusion of
contractors from government contract awards’ (2006) 10 Law, Democracy &
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Development 25). The effect of an endorsement is that no government
contract may be offered to the endorsed contractor during the period of the
endorsement (s 28(3)(a)(ii) and (iii)). While it is the convicting court that
orders the endorsement of the convicted and related persons, it is the
National Treasury that determines the length of the endorsement, which is
required to be between ﬁve and ten years (s 28(3)(a)(ii)). The Register for
Tender Defaulters is maintained by the National Treasury and is publicly
available (at www.treasury.gov.za), and all organs of state are required to
consult the register before awarding government contracts (s 28(3)(a)(iii)
read with reg 16A9.1(c) of the Treasury Regulations under the Public
Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (GN R225 GG 27388 of 15 March
2005)).
Under the Corruption Act, debarment from government contracts by
endorsement on the Register for Tender Defaulters is a severe penalty and
there is no provision for public or contracting authorities to waive or
derogate from the debarment by contracting with endorsed persons.
Furthermore, endorsement may lead to the cancellation of ongoing contracts
with the debarred contractor at the discretion of the National Treasury
(s 28(3)(a)(i)) (see Williams & Quinot op cit at 357–60).
RATIONALE FOR DEBARMENT
Excluding contractors from government business is an internationally
well-known legal mechanism (see Sue Arrowsmith, John Linarelli & Don
Wallace, Jr Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives
(2000) 41–3). For example, in the USA and in the European Community
there is an established practice of using debarment to achieve particular
objectives (see generally Christopher McCrudden Buying Social Justice
(2007); John Cibinic & Ralph Nash Formation of Government Contracts (1998)
ch 4). Debarment in these jurisdictions always includes disqualiﬁcation from
public contracts for corruption-related offences. In fact, the most recent
revisions to the EC procurement directives require member states to utilize
debarment where contractors have committed serious criminal offences,
including corruption (see Sue Arrowsmith The Law of Public and Utilities
Procurement 2 ed (2005) 747–61 and 1307–12; Sope Williams ‘The
mandatory exclusions for corruption in the new EC Procurement Direc-
tives’ (2006) 31 European LR 711 at 716–18).
Two categories of rationale
Generally the motivations for debarment mechanisms can be divided into
two categories. First, debarment can function as part of the qualiﬁcation
framework of the procurement system. Secondly, debarment can serve a
function ‘external’ to the procurement system and promote secondary
government policies such as environmental protection, maintaining fair
labour practices or empowering previously disadvantaged groups. In some
cases, as will be seen, debarment may serve both qualiﬁcation and secondary
purposes.
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A prime example of the ﬁrst category is the debarment mechanism found
in the United States Federal Acquisition Regulation (48 CFR § 9.400 et
seq). Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9.402(b) expressly states that the
‘serious nature of debarment . . . requires that these sanctions be imposed
only in the public interest for the government’s protection and not for
purposes of punishment’. Debarment under the FAR is thus directed at
ensuring that the government is protected from dealing with dishonest
contractors (Steven L Schooner ‘The paper tiger stirs: Rethinking suspension
and debarment’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement LR 211 at 212–14; Brian D
Shannon ‘Debarment and suspension revisited: Fewer eggs in the basket?’
(1995) 44 Catholic University LR 363 at 420; Steven D Gordon ‘Suspension
and debarment from federal programs’ (1994) 23 Public Contract LJ 573 at
581; Ralph C Nash & John Cibinic ‘Debarment of contractors: Punishment
or protection?’ (1987) 1 Nash & Cibinic Report 90). The aim of this
mechanism is to disqualify contractors that cannot be trusted with govern-
ment business. This type of debarment has its basis in the qualiﬁcation
framework of the procurement system itself (see Schooner op cit at 213;
Gordon op cit at 581–2).
Examples of the second category of debarment rationales are commonly
found in legislation dealing with speciﬁc economic and social policy. In the
USA, for example, debarment is used as an enforcement mechanism in
statutes implementing fair labour practices (eg the Contract Work Hours and
Safety Standards Act, 40 USC § 3704 and the Service Contract Act of 1965
(McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act), 41 USC § 354); environmental
protection (eg the Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7606 and the Clean Water Act
(Federal Water Pollution Control Act), 33 USC § 1368); and protection of
domestic industry (eg the Buy American Act, 41 USC § 10) (see Horowitz
op cit at 69; Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace op cit at 238–86; Shannon op
cit at 427–9; Andrew T Schutz ‘Too little too late: An analysis of the General
Service Administration’s proposed debarment of Worldcom’ (2004) 56
Administrative LR 1263 at 1273 and 1281–2; Project on Government Oversight
Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures of the Suspension and Debarment System
(2002) (http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/co-020505-contractors.html)).
As mentioned above, there may of course be overlap between the
qualiﬁcation debarments and debarments for external or secondary purposes.
For example, it may be argued that a contractor that does not comply with
speciﬁc legal regulation (on labour standards or environmental protection,
for instance) is generally unreliable and cannot qualify as a responsible
contractor. As a result, debarment of such a contractor based on the
secondary rationale (promoting labour standards or environmental protec-
tion) at the same time performs a qualiﬁcation function within the
procurement framework (see Arrowsmith op cit at 748 and 753; Elisabetta
Piselli ‘The scope for excluding providers who have committed criminal
offences under the EU procurement directives’ (2000) 9 Public Procurement
LR 267 at 267–9). However, it is important to bear in mind that the fulﬁlling
of a qualiﬁcation function by secondary policy debarments is incidental and
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is not the primary aim of this particular mechanism. As we will argue below,
this has important implications for the factors relevant to debarment
decisions falling within the two categories.
One type of debarment that most evidently straddles the divide between
the two categories outlined above is exclusion from public contracts based
on corruption or fraud. On the one hand, such exclusions may serve to ﬁght
corruption as a free-standing purpose ‘external’ to any procurement
qualiﬁcation objectives. In this sense, debarment functions as a punishment
for past wrongdoing and a deterrent of similar future conduct (for the
particular contractor and similarly situated persons) (see Sope Williams ‘The
debarment of corrupt contractors from World Bank-ﬁnanced contracts’
(2007) 36 Public Contract LJ 277 at 285–6; Piselli op cit at 273–4; Arrowsmith
op cit at 748; Peter Trepte Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and
Means of Public Procurement Regulation (2004) 195 and 317). On the other
hand, excluding evidently corrupt contractors from obtaining further
government contracts may have an impact on the integrity of the
procurement system and protect public funds from the risk that corrupt
contractors pose to the government (Williams European LR op cit at 715).
It is important to establish under which of the above two categories of
debarment a speciﬁc mechanism falls in order to determine whether
debarment is appropriate in any given case. This can be illustrated with
reference to the distinct debarment mechanisms found in the USA and noted
above. For debarments that are used to qualify contractors for public
contracts under the FAR (falling within the ﬁrst category outlined above),
the past misconduct of a contractor is certainly relevant, but far from
dispositive (Edwin J Tomko & Kathy C Weinberg ‘After the fall:
Conviction, debarment, and double jeopardy’ (1992) 21 Public Contract LJ
355 at 356; Gordon op cit at 582). Past corrupt activities may indeed be a
good indication that a particular contractor cannot be trusted. However, if
the focus of the debarment decision is on the present responsibility of the
contractor and the present and future potential risk to government in
contracting with that contractor, then a number of further factors should be
taken into consideration in addition to past misconduct. Factors indicating
that the contractor has successfully taken steps to eliminate the risk that
resulted in the past misconduct, for example by dismissing the relevant
personnel or implementing effective internal controls, would weigh heavily
against debarment (Gordon loc cit; Schutz op cit at 1271).
A clear understanding of the rationale behind a particular debarment
mechanism therefore becomes vital in deciding whether to debar a
contractor in a given case.
Identifying the rationale for particular mechanisms
A number of factors can help to identify the rationale of a particular
debarment mechanism. There are few jurisdictions like the US where the
rationale is expressly stated in the empowering provision, such as in FAR
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9.402(b) quoted above. Where this is not the case, it is necessary to look
elsewhere for the rationale. In some cases a good indication of the
mechanism’s rationale may be found in the considerations listed in the
legislation as having to be taken into account in making a debarment
decision (see Gordon op cit at 583–4; Tomko & Weinberg op cit at 360).
Other guidance may be found in the nature of the legislation providing for
debarment. For instance, a debarment mechanism found in environmental
protection legislation will most likely fall within the second category
outlined above, and serve a purpose external to the procurement system.
Where the nature of the empowering legislation does not provide a clear
indication, as for instance where the legislation deals with matters both
internal and external to the procurement system — such as protection of
domestic industry and linked preferential local procurement — the
immediate context of the empowering provision may provide guidance as to
its rationale. If the debarment mechanism is found in the section of the
legislation dealing with enforcement or penalties, its rationale is likely to fall
within the second category; whereas if the mechanism is found in the section
relating to qualiﬁcation, its rationale is more likely to fall within the ﬁrst
category.
Another indicator is the possibility of lifting the debarment sanction
following rehabilitation of the debarred contractor or other remedial action
(Shannon op cit at 420; Horowitz op cit at 82). Debarment mechanisms that
serve an enforcement or deterrent function, and accordingly fall in category
two, may continue despite remedial action taken by the contractor
(Horowitz loc cit). In contrast, mechanisms that serve a purpose within the
procurement framework itself generally allow for derogations or waiver of
the exclusion.
Rationale behind the Register for Tender Defaulters
The Corruption Act does not contain any express indication of the rationale
behind the creation of the Register for Tender Defaulters or endorsements
on the register. Nor does it provide any guidance on factors relevant to
debarment decisions (either to the court in ordering debarment or to the
National Treasury in determining the period of debarment) which may give
an indication of the rationale.
However, the context within which the register is created provides
important clues regarding its function. The Corruption Act embodies in
legislative form the government’s anti-corruption policy. Debarment in
terms of this Act is therefore closely related to the anti-corruption project.
Section 28, which mandates endorsements on the register, is furthermore
found in chap 5 of the Act, which deals with ‘Penalties and related matters’.
The section itself describes an endorsement order as additional to any penalty
imposed in terms of the general penalties provision of the Act (s 26). If one
goes behind the Act, one ﬁnds the statement in the Public Service
Anti-Corruption Strategy, which amongst others informed the Act, that
‘businesses found criminally guilty of corruption’ must be excluded from
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public sector contracts for a period of ﬁve years as a ‘stepping stone of the
anti-corruption strategy’ (Department of Public Service and Administration
Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (2002) 12–16 (available at http://
www.dpsa.gov.za//macc/)). It further states: ‘Such punishment must be
included in legislation as mandatory provision upon sentence.’ The context
of the Register for Tender Defaulters strongly suggests that the rationale for
this debarment mechanism is one of punishment of corrupt activities and
serves the twin purposes of retribution for past misconduct and deterrence of
future wrongdoing.
Another consideration that supports this view is the absence of derogation
from endorsements on the Register for Tender Defaulters. The Corruption
Act does not allow for any derogation from debarments in terms of s 28.
Once an endorsement order has been made, exclusion of that contractor is
mandatory and absolute (Williams & Quinot op cit at 360–1). It is therefore
irrelevant that the contractor took remedial steps subsequent to the
endorsement or even completely eliminated the risk that originally caused
the corrupt activities, for example by purging the enterprise of corrupt
employees. This absence of derogation indicates that the focus of the
mechanism is on past misconduct and sending out a message with respect to
corruption, rather than serving any function in relation to qualifying a
contractor for present or future procurement.
REGISTER FOR TENDER DEFAULTERS VIS-À-VIS OTHER
DEBARMENT MECHANISMS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
Exclusion under the Corruption Act is not the only debarment mechanism
in South African law, and not even the only one under which corrupt
activity can be a basis of exclusion (see Bolton op cit at 28–42; Sope Williams
‘The use of exclusions for corruption in developing country procurement:
The case of South Africa’ (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 1). Debarment is
also possible under other statutes, such as the Public Finance Management
Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA), the Preferential Procurement Policy FrameworkAct
5 of 2000, the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56
of 2003 (MFMA) and the State Tender Board Act 86 of 1968.
Without analysing in detail the provisions of these alternative debarment
mechanisms (see in this regard Bolton op cit and Williams Journal of African
Law op cit), it is sufﬁcient for our purposes to note that some of these
alternative mechanisms fulﬁl a function more directly related to the
procurement system itself. In other words, some of these mechanisms are in
the ﬁrst category of debarment rationales outlined above, in contrast to the
mechanism of the Corruption Act.
In terms of debarments directed at the integrity of the procurement
process, the government is protected against unscrupulous contractors by the
debarment mechanisms in the regulations under the PFMA and MFMA.
The Treasury Regulations under the PFMA (GN R225 GG 27388 15 March
2005) provide that procuring entities may disregard bids by contractors that
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‘have abused the institution’s supply chain management system’ (reg 16A9.2(i)),
‘have committed fraud or any other improper conduct in relation to such
system’ (reg 16A9.2(ii)) or ‘have failed to perform on any previous contract’ (reg
16A9.2(iii)). There is clearly an overlap between corrupt activities that may
trigger debarment in terms of these regulations and conduct that will constitute
an offence under ss 12 or 13 of the Corruption Act, triggering a potential
endorsement order under s 28 of that Act. This overlap does not, however,
result in redundant legislative provisions because of the divergent rationales of
these two types of debarment. Another important reason to keep these
debarment mechanisms apart lies in the different institutional arrangements of
these provisions. Debarment under the Corruption Act is within the discretion
of the courts and once an endorsement on the Register for Tender Defaulters
has been ordered, procuring entities have no discretion to contract with the
endorsed contractor. In contrast, debarment under the PFMA is within the
procuring entity’s discretion and can be exercised on a case-by-case basis taking
into account all relevant considerations, including the present reliability of the
contractor. These different institutional roles again follow directly from the
distinct rationales behind the respective mechanisms.
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN ORDERING ENDORSEMENT ON
THE REGISTER FOR TENDER DEFAULTERS
Based upon the corruption-speciﬁc function of the Register for Tender
Defaulters and its relationship with other debarment mechanisms in South
African law, one can identify a number of factors that may be relevant when a
court considers an endorsement order. It is not our purpose here to provide
an exhaustive list of all the factors that are generally relevant to criminal
sentencing (in this regard see S S Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South
Africa 2 ed (2007) chs 5 and 8). Below we simply outline the particular
procurement dimension of a number of relevant factors.
The gravity of the offence
The offence is naturally the primary consideration when a convicting court
exercises its sentencing discretion (Terblanche op cit 137 and 146–7). It is
thus not surprising that the seriousness of the crime is viewed as the
‘yardstick’ for the determination of the sentence (Terblanche op cit 146).
From this perspective it is important to recognize the severity of debarment
as a penalty under the Corruption Act. First, debarment will always be an
additional penalty to imprisonment or a ﬁne imposed under s 26 of the
Corruption Act. Secondly, the debarment will be for a relatively long period
of time — at least ﬁve years, but potentially up to a maximum of ten years.
Even the minimum ﬁve-year debarment is quite long when compared to the
time limits for debarment in other jurisdictions. Under the FAR in the US,
debarment is typically for a maximum period of three years, although longer
periods are possible in exceptional circumstances (FAR 9.406–4(a); Shannon
op cit at 364). Although the World Bank can debar a contractor indeﬁnitely
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under its procurement rules, most debarments by the World Bank are
currently also for a three-year period (Williams Public Contract LJ op cit at
298). Thirdly, once debarment has been ordered it is mandatory and absolute
for the set period. Given the severity of debarment as a penalty, it should be
reserved for convictions of more serious forms of contract corruption. What
exactly would qualify as such serious wrongdoing can only be worked out on
a case-by-case basis. The important point to emphasize is that, in order to
maintain an appropriate balance between the crime committed and the
punishment, debarment should not be ordered too easily under the
Corruption Act.
Previous convictions for corruption
Section 271 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) allows
prosecutors in all criminal matters to submit to the convicting court a record
of previous convictions of the accused for the purposes of sentencing. If such
convictions are admitted or proved, the court is under an obligation to take
them into account when imposing a sentence (s 271(4)). When a court
considers endorsement on the Register for Tender Defaulters, previous
corruption convictions are thus particularly relevant. Since debarment is an
additional penalty under the Corruption Act, it is submitted that endorse-
ment should be ordered for repeat offenders and not, except in cases of
particularly serious corruption charges, for ﬁrst-time offenders. It should be
kept in mind that government risk is not necessarily affected by a failure to
endorse a ﬁrst-time offender under the Corruption Act. Debarment of that
contractor remains possible under the PFMA and MFMA debarment
mechanisms based on the corruption conviction.
While the CPA refers only to previous convictions of the accused being put
before the court, under the Corruption Act the court may also order
endorsement of related parties following conviction of the accused.
Debarment of a related party will be particularly apt where that related party
has previous corruption convictions, even if the accused is a ﬁrst-time
offender. This will avoid the possibility of persons convicted of corruption
using substitute entities to obtain government contracts. It is thus important
for a court to consider the previous convictions not only of the accused, but
also of relevant related parties.
Nature of the contractor and the impact of debarment on it
It is important to distinguish between enterprise contractors and natural-
person contractors when considering a debarment order. In the case of
enterprises, a large number of innocent employees may be adversely affected
by endorsement, especially where the enterprise obtains most of its business
from the public sector. Also, where the convicted contractor is a large
enterprise with many divisions, a court should carefully consider the impact
of exclusion on the enterprise as a whole where only one particular division
transgressed and there is no evidence to suggest a culture of corruption in the
broader enterprise. Whether the offence was an isolated incident within the
ﬁrm will thus be relevant in such a case.
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The nature of the enterprise’s business is also a relevant factor. The impact
of debarment will obviously be much greater on a ﬁrm that operates within a
government monopoly market, such as defence procurement, than one able
to obtain business from the private sector such as private auditing ﬁrms.
None of the above factors on the nature of the contractor and the
potential impact of exclusion can be dispositive of the debarment question.
However, they are important considerations in establishing the severity of
the punishment in a particular case, which is crucial in weighing up
debarment as a suitable punishment against the offence at issue.
Furthermore, where the contractor is an enterprise it is appropriate that
the natural persons behind the persona of the enterprise involved in
committing the offence also be endorsed. The effectiveness of debarment as
punishment will be greatly undermined if the enterprise alone is excluded,
since it will allow the real culprits to escape censure. Under s 28(1) of the
Corruption Act it appears that where the convict is an enterprise and the
court decides to order an endorsement, it must include ‘the particulars of any
partner, manager, director or other person, who wholly or partly exercises or
may exercise control over that enterprise and who was involved in the
offence concerned or who knows or ought reasonably to have known or
suspected that the enterprise committed the offence concerned’
(s 28(1)(b)(ii)). This would mean that such natural persons behind the
enterprise are also debarred. Section 28(1) is not, however, entirely clear and
may be open to alternative interpretations (see Williams & Quinot op cit at
349–50).
The potential impact of endorsement on the government and society
Finally, it is also important for a court to keep in mind the potential impact
on government business of endorsing a particular contractor. While the
exclusion of a contractor from government business may be an effective
punishment for that contractor, it may also have far-reaching adverse
consequences for government. This will be the case in markets with a small
number of contractors. Thus, according to Schooner, ‘[w]ith fewer major,
critical contractors available to compete for the Government’s most
sophisticated requirements, it seems disingenuous to bar a key player from
future competition. Such behaviour might be described as cutting off one’s
nose to spite one’s face’ (Schooner op cit at 214). The adverse consequences
of debarment to the government need to be balanced against the desire to
combat and punish corruption. The question then becomes how much a
society is willing to pay in support of its anti-corruption objectives. Whilst
the ﬁght against corruption is undoubtedly an important societal goal and
one to which South African society must commit itself, this commitment
needs to be justiﬁed on the balance of costs and beneﬁts to the society. For
instance, society may not and ought not to be willing to compromise its
internal and external security by debarring critical defence contractors who
have been proved to have engaged in corruption. Another example may
occur in the case of corrupt housing contractors. Is society prepared to accept
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much slower delivery of housing with resultant continuing homelessness of
millions of South Africans when housing contractors are debarred and prices
consequently increase in a less competitive market, all in the name of ﬁghting
corruption? These examples illustrate that a choice in favour of imposing the
anti-corruption mechanism of debarment may have signiﬁcant cost implica-
tions for society. It is accordingly only proper that courts openly engage in
debate on whether the choice is justiﬁed in a given instance.
CONCLUSION
The view that the debarment mechanism created in the Corruption Act
serves as punishment for past corrupt activities has important implications for
its use by criminal courts. It implies that convicting courts should focus on
debarment as an appropriate punishment in the given instance within the
framework of the offence, the offender and societal aims. Courts should not
necessarily attempt to use the debarment provisions to police government
contracting as there are adequate alternative debarment mechanisms to
maintain the integrity of the procurement system and protect the govern-
ment against undue business risks in contracting with irresponsible contrac-
tors. The important differences between these various types of debarment in
South African law accentuate the need to keep them apart. Chief amongst
these differences is the divergent institutional arrangements. Whereas
debarment in terms of the Corruption Act lies solely in the discretion of the
courts, the alternative debarment mechanisms in statutes such as the PFMA
and MFMAare within the administrative discretion of procurement ofﬁcials,
with signiﬁcant ﬂexibility in application. The latter arrangements are much
better suited to serve the purposes of an effective procurement system than
judicial involvement.
The difference in rationales underlying various debarment mechanisms
also highlights the need to treat foreign case law and statutes on debarment
with caution. Accordingly, the well-established US jurisprudence and FAR
provisions on debarment are of less relevance when courts have to make
debarment decisions under the Corruption Act, since the US regulations are
premised on the objective of ensuring that the government contracts only
with responsible contractors as a central aim of the procurement system. As
we have argued above, this is not the primary aim of debarment under the
Corruption Act.
Finally, when a court has to decide whether to order debarment and to
what extent, the factors that are relevant call for close liaison between
prosecutors and public procurement ofﬁcials. The input of the latter group is
particularly important to enable a court to appreciate the potential severity of
an endorsement on the Register for Tender Defaulters.
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